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It was a sunny and warm day in February 2015, in the midst of an otherwise atypically rainy and 
cold Sicilian winter. Awate and Drissa1 sat next to one other on the edge of the covered balcony 
at the small reception center for asylum seekers where they lived. Both wore headphones but 
their bodies moved out of sync as they followed the different rhythms that pumped into their 
ears. Driving together past the center2 with his car window down, Roberto commented as I sat 
next to him: “They always seem so relaxed, with their headphones and flashy shoes. They are 
taken care of. I wish someone would think about me, too.” Roberto is an unemployed graduate in 
his mid-twenties, who was born in Sicily and lives with his parents just a couple of blocks away 
from the center. Roughly the same age as Roberto, Awate escaped indefinite forced military 
service in Eritrea, and Drissa fled abuses of both armed groups and state security forces in Mali. 
They both reached Sicily in 2014 after surviving a sea journey along the deadly central 
Mediterranean route departing from Libya.3 Unlike many migrants who arrive in and quickly 
leave Sicily, Awate and Drissa decided not to embark on another uncertain journey towards a 
Northern European destination, and instead entered the institutional maze of Sicilian reception 
centers for asylum seekers. Awate was forcibly fingerprinted and thus obliged to apply for 
asylum in Italy according to the Dublin Regulation.4 Drissa felt exhausted after years on the 
move and a particularly traumatic sea experience—the boat he was on capsized and he was 
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rescued by the Italian Navy just when he thought he had no strength left to stay afloat. His plan 
was to stay put and try to find what he called “peace and stability” in Italy. However, what 
Awate, Drissa, and many other asylum seekers have mainly found so far is a widespread climate 
of suspicion and resentment. The comment made by Roberto, their new Sicilian neighbor, is just 
a small sign of such tension. 
 
Refugees as Targets of Resentment and Exploitation in Marginalized Peripheries  
Since its opening in 2014, the small reception center has hosted about 30 male asylum seekers, 
most of them in their twenties and coming from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. It has contributed 
to the local economy, but resentment from local residents has exposed migrants to abuse and 
exploitation. The center has created new jobs for the residents of the impoverished Sicilian town, 
hiring six staff members in roles such as social worker, educator, and language teacher. Most of 
those hired have little professional background, were previously unemployed, and obtained the 
jobs through family connections. Yet working conditions are tough as payment is often delayed 
for months at a time and professional training is practically non-existent. In addition to 
employment, the center has indirectly contributed to the municipal budget. In a town starved for 
resources and stricken by debt, the municipality has silently but repeatedly redirected the funding 
sent by the Ministry of Interior to support the center toward long overdue payment of public 
employees, especially when they have threatened to strike.5  
 Local residents know little about the center’s contribution to the economy, and instead 
view the center as an institution that, as one resident put it, “takes care of migrants,” whereas 
they, as citizens, feel neglected by the Italian state. Inaccurate information about reception 
centers—for example the widespread rumor that asylum seekers receive 35 Euros per day—
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cements residents’ belief that they are experiencing institutional betrayal by a government that is 
against citizens and in favor of migrants. In reality, the 35 Euros per day go toward the overall 
workings of the center, including services such as food, housing, and clothing. Asylum seekers 
themselves only receive about 1.50 Euros per day as pocket money. Residents accuse migrants of 
being privileged by the state, an accusation that fits with a longstanding local routine of 
complaining about state abandonment and disregard. Yet it is asylum seekers who arguably find 
themselves at the bottom of the local socioeconomic order. For example, although they are 
legally entitled to work six months after they claim asylum, they are exposed to highly 
exploitative working conditions, especially in the many greenhouses surrounding the town and, 
in the summer months, in the restaurants and bars at nearby seaside tourist locations.  
The highly mediatized scandals of corruption that engulf the institutional system of 
reception for asylum seekers deepen the climate of suspicion within and around the center. This 
is particularly true for the so-called “Capital Mafia” (Mafia Capitale) scandal. As part of the 
investigation into this scandal, a conversation between a public administrator and the head of an 
organization managing reception centers was recorded, in which they refer to these centers as 
more lucrative than anything else, including drugs.6 The transcripts of this conversation were 
widely circulated on national and international news. Against the backdrop of this negative 
media coverage, the Sicilian reception center’s staff and asylum seekers throw additional 
accusations of dishonesty and manipulation at one another. The former accuse some of the 
asylum seekers of using the center or the state as “a cow to milk” (una mucca da mungere). 
Migrants accuse the staff and, more generally, “the Italians” of making a profit out of their 
presence, saying things like, “They eat all the money” (loro mangiano tutti i soldi). Local 
residents resent everyone involved in the reception system, including “the corrupt politicians” in 
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the distant seats of national power, the many organizations involved in managing centers of 
reception, and the migrants who in their view are “waited on, hand and foot” (serviti e riveriti). 
All are viewed with suspicion. 
 
Protracted and Dispersed Emergencies  
Suspicion and resentment are reproduced by a migration emergency policy discourse that, 
despite Italy’s now well-established status as a destination country, continues to frame migrant 
mobilities as threatening but temporary “invasions” and to manage them through emergency 
devices. While most undocumented migrants in Italy are those who overstayed student or work 
visas, the arrival of migrants by boat has been central to official “emergency” talks and the 
resulting public moral panic about “migration invasions” since 1991, when boats arrived from 
Albania to the shores of Puglia, a southern region.7 So-called emergency measures have 
punctuated Italy’s approach to migrant mobility at an accelerated pace in the last five years, 
including the 2011 North African emergency plan to deal with the arrival by boat of about 
30,000 Tunisians in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution in 2011;8 the 2014 Mare Nostrum 
(“Our Sea”) rescue operation in response to the increasing number of migrant deaths in the 
Mediterranean;9 and the still developing project of European Union-sponsored hotspots in 
Southern Italy (and Greece) to fingerprint and process arriving migrants.10   
 Italy’s definition of emergency does not stop at rescue operations at sea or processing 
procedures at arrival points. Rather, it suffuses the entire Italian reception system for asylum 
seekers. This system patches together different institutions, including thousands of temporary 
structures for immediate support; a dozen large centers of reception (CARA) concentrating 
hundreds or at times thousands of asylum seekers, often in southern rural areas and urban 
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peripheries;11 and hundreds of smaller centers (SPRAR), which, compared to CARA centers, are 
supposedly more attentive to asylum seekers’ individual needs and more oriented toward life 
after the institutional reception system. The center that was opened in Roberto’s hometown is 
one of the 430 small SPRAR centers dispersed throughout Italy.12 Established in 2002, the 
SPRAR system was, for over a decade, a very small program catering to only 3000 asylum 
seekers per year. In 2014 the state decided to expand it to over 20,000 centers, sending a growing 
number of asylum seekers directly to them rather than to the corrupt and abuse scandal ridden 
CARA centers.13 The ongoing expansion of the SPRAR system has meant that, over the course 
of two years, hundreds of new SPRAR centers have been established, many of them in Sicily and 
other southern regions.14 While some of the SPRAR centers remain true to the initial role of 
acting as a bridge towards the broader society, informing asylum seekers of their rights and 
listening to their needs, many other SPRAR centers, especially those hastily opened under the 
pressure of the recent expansion, arguably resemble the larger centers in their opportunistic, 
controlling, and inward looking approach to the management of asylum seekers. These centers 
effectively impose on the asylum seekers they host what, in his analysis of “total institutions,” 
sociologist Erving Goffman describes as “an enclosed, formally administered round of life.” This 
institutionalized “round of life,”15 which is limited to six months and renewable for another six 
months, is oriented inward, toward the preservation of order through practices of scrutiny and 
control16 rather than toward life after the center. Thus, life after the center is often marked by 
abandonment and abjection.  
 
An Enclosed Institutional Life under Scrutiny   
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Scrutiny and control are central to the operation of the center that houses Awate and Drissa and 
28 other asylum seekers. Threaded within the fabric of its institutional life is a process by which 
staff members attempt to identify what they conceive of as trustful and grateful personalities, and 
encourage or even forcibly move out of the center (and the town) those refugees with the 
“wrong” types of personalities. This process is visible and vocalized in discussions during staff 
meetings, and it also spills over into everyday interactions between staff and asylum seekers, 
especially at times of tension and disagreement.  
 Sitting on a bench in the main square of the town, Awate, who counts on the legal advice 
of the center to obtain his papers and then apply for reunification with his wife and young 
daughter waiting in a Sudanese camp, told me how it is important for him to avoid the reputation 
of being a troublemaker: “I am in the hands of the government. Everything they do is fine with 
me.” Then he added: “If it is not fine, it is still fine.” Personality matters: it can mean the 
difference between support and expulsion. The staff of the center rely on everyday interactions to 
categorize asylum seekers along personality traits such as “submissive” (servizievoli) and 
“willing” (volenterosi), versus “distrustful” (sospettosi). The enclosed institutional life of the 
center denies the complexity of migrants’ inner lifeworlds, especially when affected by forced 
displacement. Monica, a social worker at the center in her early thirties, expressed her self-
confidence in detecting different personalities:  
I get to know them individually, they are all different people, some are friendly, 
some are willing, some are distrustful…What I see every day tells me what this 
person is all about…it is not so difficult to understand if this person is a sincere 
person, a person that is really trying to do something good in their life…in the 
same way it is quite easy to understand if the person only knows how to complain, 
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if the person is not interested in understanding, in adapting...and unfortunately in 
these cases we are obliged to send them away. 
The consequential effects of this everyday scrutiny are not lost on the asylum seekers. This is 
particularly the case for so-called distrustful dispositions. After a heated argument with a 
member of staff, a young refugee from Sudan named Suleyman worried about his reputation and 
pondered whether to try to mend the damaged relationship or, given that he had obtained his 
papers, prepare to leave the Sicilian town. The argument was about an apparently banal matter: 
where to keep the original copies of Suleyman’s documents. Suleyman had expressed his desire 
to keep the originals while the staff member had emphasized with increased impatience that 
established practice at the center is to keep the original copies in a locked cabinet accessible only 
to the staff. Keeping the documents in his room was a sign of control and independence, 
Suleyman explained to me after the altercation. Yet Suleyman’s preoccupation was warranted. 
Marco, the staff member who had eventually thrown the documents into Suleyman’s face telling 
him that he was a “pain in the butt” and that he “could leave,” later explained to me that the 
center does not tolerate expressions of distrust. He later added with evident disappointment, 
“Why doesn’t he trust us, that we keep the originals in good shape? I am sure he was thinking 
‘my documents are safe only with me, with them who knows what they are doing with them.’” 
 Center employees look for welcome signs of gratefulness and goodwill toward the center 
and the broader hosting community. One way for asylum seekers to exhibit these appreciated 
traits is through their participation in volunteer activities. During staff meetings, social workers 
compile lists of asylum seekers they will ask to volunteer and those that they plan to exclude for 
various reasons, such as their employment commitments or their unwilling personalities. Those 
asked to join the activities face the dilemma of accepting or refusing. Such was the case for 
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Drissa one early April morning as he was standing a few meters behind Antonio’s car. Antonio, a 
staff member at the center in his late twenties, was locked in a game with Drissa for about 20 
minutes. Antonio would shout at Drissa to get in the car but Drissa would not move. So Antonio 
would spin the car, signalling that he was going to drive away without Drissa. At that point, 
Drissa would shout for Antonio to wait for him while starting to walk slowly toward the car, but 
when Antonio would stop the car, Drissa too would stop walking. Antonio was half amused and 
half annoyed at Drissa’s behavior. He was playing with him but also trying to convince him to 
get in the car. He was also running out of time as he was supposed to drive Drissa and two other 
asylum seekers to clean a nearby beach, a volunteer activity that the center regularly co-
organizes with a local environmental organization. This game between Antonio and Drissa 
seemed at first glance like an innocuous contest between old friends. Yet Antonio and Drissa 
were neither peers nor friends, and as Drissa sensed that Antonio’s irritation was growing he ran 
to get in the car and participate in the volunteer activity. This activity, which lasted about five 
hours, entailed the removal of cans, plastic bags, and other items of trash from the beach and 
ended with a series of photos of the refugee volunteers, which would later be featured on the 
website of the environmental organization. A few days later, as Drissa and I talked informally 
about the volunteer activity, he expressed his frustration: “I don’t want to work for free. Work 
for free and work for photos--this is [a sign of] our weakness.” At the same time, he feared 
disappointing the center’s staff. Asylum seekers attempt to anticipate or manage the taxonomic 
power of the reception centers where they live, either by cultivating the type of personality that 
the center rewards or preparing to deal with the consequences.  
 
 
Chains of Marginality 
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 When asylum seekers arrive on the Sicilian shores they do not just arrive in Europe; they 
arrive in a marginalized periphery with its own history of dispossession and emigration and its 
own present condition of socioeconomic crisis. Far from operating in a vacuum, the Sicilian 
reception centers for asylum seekers are enmeshed in these histories and experiences of 
marginality. In this sense, the dispositions that the center’s staff and other local residents display 
in their everyday interactions with Awate, Suleyman, Drissa, and other globally displaced people 
cannot be fully explained by generalizing, abstract frameworks that emphasize institutional 
violence against refugees, or racist attitudes toward noncitizens or non-Europeans. European 
colonial, racial histories and postcolonial structures of power play an important role in shaping 
the moralizing and resentful attitudes that arriving asylum seekers from Asia, the Middle East, 
and Africa experience in Sicily. However, so do the distinct local histories and experiences of 
marginality. Refuge in impoverished Sicilian towns is therefore chained to local marginalities in 
a double sense: marginality works as both a fetter and a link. It creates feelings of being stuck in 
a place marked by injustices more than rights, by exploitation more than respect. While these 
feelings are real for both local residents and arriving asylum seekers, they are caused by different 
life experiences and raise fears of scarcity, which push local residents to cling to their own sense 
of injustice and downplay that of marginalized asylum seekers. As a result, rather than producing 
empathy or solidarity, these chains of marginality produce distinct injuries for those seeking 
refuge.  
 A final illustrative example can help flesh out how these nested marginalities play out in 
the institutional reception of refugees. The center’s social workers express irritation at asylum 
seekers’ complaints about humiliating and exploitative working conditions and are particularly 
aggravated with those that refuse certain types of jobs, for example agricultural jobs. As Antonio 
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puts it, “This is the situation, if you have an opportunity to work, don’t let it go or don’t 
complain about it…if it is heavy work, you do it, if they give you 35 euros per day you don’t spit 
on them.” Antonio adds: “The reality is that we all work off the books, we are not protected. All 
the jobs I did were without contracts, in the restaurants, bars, supermarkets…what is the 
alternative?” In his interpretation of “the situation,” what Antonio resists is an acknowledgment 
of the marginality of others--in this case, globally displaced people who are profoundly exposed 
to misrecognition, indignity and exploitation. Similarly, researchers on refugees in an Italy and 
Europe marked by longstanding inequalities must recognize these nested marginalities and 
experiences of suffering. In so doing, they may help identify potential bases for solidarity across 
marginal groups rather than estrangement between them. 
 
                                                 
Endnotes 
 
1 All names are fictitious. Sentences and words in quotation marks come from my interviews and informal dialogues 
with asylum seekers, staff, and residents in a Sicilian town. I do not identify the town’s name to ensure the 
anonymity of the asylum seekers and refugees that I encountered. I conducted my fieldwork from January to April 
2015 and revisited the town in May and August 2015 for ten days each time. 
2 Asylum seekers would typically use the word “camp” to refer to the reception center. For space limits this article 
signals but does not analyze this preference. 
3 Migrant arrivals in Italy through the central Mediterranean route were 170,100 in 2014, 153,842 in 2015, and 
181,436 in 2016. They stood at 15,582 in the first three months of 2017. Recorded migrant deaths in the 
Mediterranean as a whole were 3,279 in 2014, 3,673 in 2015, and 5,079 in 2016. The central Mediterranean route 
from Libya to Italy was the most popular and deadly from 2014 until mid-2015, while the eastern Mediterranean 
route from Turkey to Greece was intensively used in 2015 with 850,000 arrivals, and was particularly deadly in the 
second half of the year. In 2016, the central Mediterranean route was once again the most used and deadly one. This 
trend continued through the first three months of 2017, during which there were 525 recorded deaths, almost all of 
them in the central Mediterranean route. Needless to say, many deaths in the Mediterranean go unrecorded. For 
details on sea arrivals and deaths in the Mediterranean see https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-
arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079. For an early account of the central Mediterranean route see Naor Ben-
Yehoyada, “The Clandestine Central Mediterranean Passage,” Middle East Report 261 (Winter 2011). 
4 According to the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first EU country they reach. They 
should be fingerprinted and entered in the European database called Eurodac in the first port of arrival. Intra-EU 
migrant mobilities have challenged this regulation. 
5 This redirection of funding obviously has negative repercussions on the services that the center can offer to asylum 
seekers. 
6 The recording is available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NzexUMmMyo. 
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7 These boats carried about 15,000 Albanian migrants. The Italian government collectively detained them in a sports 
stadium without adequate services and deported them in the following weeks. 
8 On the state of emergency declared by Italy in 2011 see Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, “Arab Springs 
Making Space: Territoriality and Moral Geographies for Asylum Seekers in Italy,” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 31, 6 (2013), pp. 1004-1021. See also Amanda Ufheil-Somers, “Lampedusa, A Primer,” Middle 
East Report 261 (Winter 2011).  
9 Mare Nostrum was subsequently repealed and substituted by the still active Operation Triton, which has an 
emphasis on border control rather than rescuing lives. On the Mare Nostrum and Triton rescue operations, see 
Martina Tazzioli, “Border Displacements: Challenging the Politics of Rescue between Mare Nostrum and Triton,” 
Migration Studies 4, 1 (2016), pp. 1-19. 
10 For a preliminary discussion of the EU hotspots in Italy, see Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, “The EU 
hotspot approach at Lampedusa,” Open Democracy, February 26, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/glenda-garelli-martina-tazzioli/eu-hotspot-approach-at-lampedusa. 
11 Some of the largest CARA centers in the South are situated near agricultural areas renowned for attracting 
migrant labor.  
12 On the expansion of the SPRAR see http://www.sprar.it/images/Atlante_Sprar_2015.pdf. 
13 The “Capital Mafia” corruption scandal involved the management of CARA centers in Sicily. 
14 Sicily has the highest percentage of SPRAR (21.9%) of all Italian regions except the central region of Lazio, 
where most SPRARs are concentrated in Rome, the capital city (22.9%). 
15 Goffman’s full definition of “total institution” is: “a place of residence and work where a large number of like-
situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, 
formally administered round of life.” See Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental 
Patients and Other Inmates (Bantam Doubleday Publishing Group, [1968] 1990), p. xiii. 
16 For an insightful and concise account of the moralizing regime of control imposed on asylum seekers in centers of 
reception in Italy, see Barbara Pinelli, “After the Landing: Moral Control and Surveillance,” Anthropology Today 
31, 2 (April 2015), pp. 12-14. 
